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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This action arose out of an alleged breach of contract. The 
parties entered into a joint venture agreement to develop a subdivision 
and share in the net profits derived from the venture. Each party 
sought an accounting and a dissolution of the joint venture. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before a jury on the issue of breach of 
contract which returned a verdict of no cause of action in favor of 
Coombs. Smith and The Squire, Inc. asked for a new trial, and a partial 
new trial was granted. The matter was then submitted to the Trial Court 
for determination on the evidence submitted to the jury. The Trial 
Court found no cause of action and found that the joint venture contract 
between the parties had been modified by a subsequent oral agreement. 
The issue of an accounting and dissolution of the joint venture was 
submitted solely to the Trial Court. The Trial Court found the terms 
of the contract as it relates to distribution of net profits to mean 
"net profits before taxes" and further that Coombs did not need to 
account for the trade-in properties received from the sale of the lots 
in the subdivision. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellants, Smith and The Squire, Inc. seek reversal of the 
Trial Court1s Judgment as to no cause of action for two specific 
alleged breaches by Coombs of the joint venture agreement and for 
judgment in the amount of $7'+,255.M-6; a proper interpretation of the 
clear and unambiguous language of the joint venture contract of "net 
profit" to mean "net profits" and not "net profits before taxes"; and 
requiring Coombs to account for $3,4-31.88 of trade-in value Coombs re-
ceived on the sale of two lots in the subdivision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Vista International Corporation and Lynn H. Coombs entered into 
an Agreement to develop certain land. This agreement is Exhibit 2-P. 
Coombs adjnitted he signed the contract and admitted that it was correct 
in all of its terms (R. 311, 312). On January 12, 1973 Smith acquired 
Vista1s position in the agreement (R. 16). 
The agreement (Exhibit 2-P) is an integrated instrument which 
details the obligations as well as the benefits to the respective parties. 
Smith, for purposes of appeal, complained that Coombs breached the con-
tract in the following particulars: 
A. Coombs breached his obligations to develop the subdivision 
within the cost breakdown contained in the contract. 
B. Coombs failed to sell seven lots per month and therefore 
should pay the interest on the development loan (R. 287). 
CoombsT defense to the asserted breaches consisted of: 
A. General denial. 
B. Cost overruns resulted from the lack of timely financing. 
C. Coombs was relieved of the obligations to sell seven lots 
per month by subsequent oral agreement (R. 282, 283). 
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The Agreement specifically required Coombs to be responsible 
for the development of a subdivision, the cost of which was not to ex-
ceed $141,665.00 (Ex. 2-P). The development costs exceeded that figure 
by $40,770.00 (R. 287, 480 and Ex. 34-P). The agreement required Coombs 
to sell seven (7) lots per month or in the event Coombs failed to do so, 
Coombs agreed to pay the monthly interest on the development loans for 
each month he failed to sell seven lots (Ex. 2-P). It is conceded by 
Coombs that he never sold seven lots in any month (R0 320). It is un-
disputed that the interest on the development loan during the period 
was $33,485.46 (Ex. 35-P). 
Coombs organized a company known as The Squire, Inc. through 
which the parties were to effectuate the joint venture (R. 411). Vista 
was to obtain development financing of up to $150,000.00. Coombs was 
to receive payment of $37,500.00 for the raw land, and to be fully 
responsible for the development of the subdivision by putting in the 
offsite improvements of roads, sewer, curb and gutter and utilities. 
Coombs further was responsible for the selling of the lots (R. 313). 
The parties agreed to share the benefits of the joint venture on a 
40% basis to Coombs and 60% basis to Smith (formerly Vista) of the 
"net profit from the sale of lots" (Ex0 2-P). 
Smith asserts that "net profits" means after taxes, while Coombs 
asserts this language means "net profits before taxes". Elmer Fox and 
Company accounting, (a copy of which is in the Exhibit folder), made an 
allocation of the distribution after taxes and further discloses that 
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the sum of $27,4-12.00 in taxes had been paid by The Squire, Inc. durirg 
1969 through 1973 (R. 30). The trial courtTs judgment reflects a dis-
tribution of "net profits before taxes" (R. 11, 12 and 20). 
Both parties sought an accounting and a dissolution of the joint 
venture (R. 280, 288, 289). In the accounting rendered by the respective 
parties, each asserts error on appeal (R. M-, 7 and 8). Smith asserts 
that Coombs has not properly accounted for the following items: 
A0 The trade-in on Lot No. 25 sold to Doyle 
B. $1,600.00 for the trade-in on the Slayton lot. 
Coombs asserts the trial court erred in not allowing Coombs to keep the 
rents Coombs collected (R. M-, 7 and 8). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
COOMBS BREACHED THE JOINT VENTURE 
AGREEMENT BY EXCEEDING THE DEVELOP-
MENT COSTS AND FAILING TO SELL 
SEVEN LOTS PER MONTH. 
Coombs, by the terms of Exhibit 2-P, "shall be fully responsible 
for the development of the subdivision, including . . .the cost of said 
off-site improvements not to exceed. . .$14-1,665.00." It is undisputed 
that the development costs exceeded the schedule by $4-0,770.00 (see 
Exhibit 34-P). 
The Trial Court found that the cost overrun did exist but con-
cluded that Vista had "waived any right to recover by increasing the 
lots sales prices. . .and modified Exhibit 2-P". (R. 19). This con-
clusion of law is "naked" inasmuch as waiver and/or modification is an 
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affirmative defense, see Rule 8(c) URCP, which is conspicuous by its 
very absence from Defendants pleadings. Not only is this defense 
deemed waived under Rule 12 (h) URCP but the evidence adduced at trial 
does not support such a conclusion. 
It is recognized that a written contract can be modified or 
substituted, even by a subsequent oral agreement, as is stated in 
Southern Acid & Sulphur Co. vQ Childs, 207 Ark. 1109, 18M- SW2d 586 
(19M-5) at page 588: 
"We are mindful of the principle that a written 
contract may be modified or substituted by a sub-
sequent oral agreement, but the burden is upon 
the party asserting the subsequent modification 
to show the assent of the other party thereto.TT 
(citations omitted and emphasis supplied) 
The very recent case of PLC Landscape Const, v. Piccadilly Fish TN Chips, 
Inc., 28 Ut 2d 350, 502 P2d 562 (1972) at page 563 acknowledges the 
foregoing proposition while requiring mutual consent: 
TT
0 . .any such change, modification, extension 
or addition to their arrangement for doing busi-
ness with each other that they may mutually 
agree." (citations omitted) 
The general law is well stated in 17 AmJur 2d Contracts §M-65 
pages 93*4- and 935 which states: 
"Undoubtedly, a contract may be modified with the 
assent of both parties, provided the modification 
does not violate the law or public policy, and 
provided that there is consideration for the new 
agreement. . .
 0The mental purpose of one of the 
parties to a contract cannot change its terms, 
nor are indefinite expressions sufficient to 
establish a binding agreement to change the for-
mal requirements of a written contract. A re-
quest, suggestion or proposal of alteration or 
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modification, made after an unconditional acceptance 
of an offer, and not assented to by the opposite 
party, does not affect the contract then in force 
and effect by reason of the acceptance0 One receiv-
ing an offer to change a contract to which he is a 
party is held to be under no obligation to answer 
it; and his silence cannot be construed as an accept-
ance where nothing else is shown. Mere negotiations 
between the parties will not suffice to produce a 
modification. Before that result can be accomplished, 
the negotiations must ripen into a mutual, valid and 
enforceable agreement to modify the old contract0TT 
(emphasis supplied) 
This view is particularly applicable in this instance and is supported 
by Utah law in Schofield v. ZionTs Co-op Mercantile Institution, 85 Ut 
281, 39 P2d 34-2, 3M-5 (1934) wherein this court stated: 
"When the plaintiffs had completely performed their 
obligations0 0 .the contract was complete and bind-
ing, and not subject to modification by the company 
without consent of plaintiffsQTT (emphasis supplied) 
Coombs asserts the alleged modification came about in conver-
sations with Mr. Prestwich. Mr. CoombsT testimony is in direct conflict 
with that of Mr. PrestwichTs0 Mr. CoombsT testimony is very dub-
ious at best and it is submitted that Coombs constantly altered his 
testimony to fit the occasion. For example, about the cost over-runs 
with which he had sole responsibility Coombs testified: 
T?Q. (by Mr0 Brown) 0 Now, Mr. Coombs, do you know 
the cost of the actual development of those lots 
with the streets and the gutter and the curb, and 
the sewer and everything? 
A. No. 
Q. You donTt know those costs? 
A0 No. (R. 312, 313)" 
Later, after 2 days of trial and a number of recesses, Coombs testified: 
a 
TTQo (by Mr. Gordon). Now, in your capacity as 
supervisor of the development, did you have con-
tact with any of the persons who were to do the 
work on the subdivision to develop it? 
A. I got the contractor's bid forms. . .and re-
quested bids from them. 
Q. What did you do with them? 
A0 After we collected the bids at the bid opening, 
we went through them — most of the contractor's 
were there at the opening. I took the bids to Mr. 
Prestwich, he and I went over the bids, added up 
figures to see if these were reasonable, and sel-
ected the bid to take on the subdivision." (R.379) 
Again under Mr. Gordon, Coombs testified: 
TTQ0 Are you aware of that (the cost over-runs)? 
Ao Yes. 
Q. Did you discuss those cost over-runs with any 
one from The Squire, Inc.? 
Ao Many times#TT 
It was at this point that Mr. Coombs conveniently remembered the alleged 
modification (R. M-30). 
"And we discussed it for quite a while. I sug-
gested that we'll have to do — the only way 
we'll have to cover this is to raise the price 
of the lots. And as we discussed that I suggested 
that we raise the price of the lots to cover the 
amount of the over-runs at the time, and he ac-
cepted that situation. We established terms on 
what the lots would be selling for, the price, 
the minimum terms and was authorized to sell 
them on that basis from then on0 
Q. Did you proceed to selling the lots then for 
that increased cost? 
Ao Yes. We did that several times0 We increased 
the price several times to cover these costs0TT 
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CoombsT remarkable memory will become even more apparent in subse-
quent points. 
The testimony is clear and concise on the part of Vista that no 
such modification had ever been agreed to. Mr. Prestwich, President of 
The Squire, Inc. during the critical time, testified at page M-52 of the 
record, that one change from $35,000.00 to $37,500.00 for payment to 
Coombs on the raw land had been made: 
TTQ. But no other term had ever been altered? 
A. To my recollection, no. 
Q. Did you ever authorize any other changes? 
N. No. Never
 0
TT 
The law is well settled that both parties must agree with all 
of the formalities of a new contract to effectuate a modification. As 
the court stated in Keco Industries, Inc. v. ACF Industries, Incorporated, 
(M-CCA-1963) , 316 F2d 513, 516: 
tT
0 . .mutual assent is as much a requisite element 
in effecting a contractual modification as it is 
in the initial creation of a contract.TT (citations 
omitted) 
Further 1 Corbin on Contracts, §72 p 306 states: 
"If a party to an existing contract proposes a 
modification thereof, the mere silence of the 
other party leaves the contract as before with-
out modification." 
The contract had been fully performed by Vista at the time of 
the alleged modification. At 17 AmJur 2d, Contracts §4-61, page 929 it 
states: 
-8-
"Where a contract has been fully performed by one 
party, the consent of the other party is insuf-
ficient consideration for an agreement discharging, 
modifying or replacing the original contract; in 
such case, some other consideration is necessary 
TT 
• • • 
Again at 17 AmJur 2d, Contracts §4-69, page 939: 
TT
0 . .most courts support the general principle 
that a modification can be nothing but a new 
contract and must be supported by a considerat-
ion like every other contract." 
In the case of H & W Paving Co. v. Asphalt Paving Company, 147 
Colo 506, 364- P2d 185, (1961), the general law has been expressed as 
follows: 
"Numerous authorities might be cited in support 
of the proposition that in order to avoid the 
duties imposed by the terms of a written con-
tract through a subsequent parol agreement, the 
latter must be supported by an adequate consid-
eration moving to the party who would otherwise 
be entitled to enforce the written agreement.
 0 ." 
In the very recent case of Rosellini v. Banchero, 83 Wash 2d 268, 517 
P2d 955, 958 (1974) the Washington court concluded: 
". o .a modification or subsequent agreement is 
not supported by consideration if one party is 
to perform some additional obligation while the 
other party is simply to perform that which he 
promised in the original contract...We hold 
that under such circumstances the second agree-
ment must be supported by consideration." 
The foregoing argument is applicable to the alleged waiver 
and/or modification as it relates to the interest provisions for CoombsT 
failure to sell seven lots per month. The only testimony even asserting 
an alleged waiver and/or modification of the provisions requiring Coombs 
to sell seven lots per month or pay the interest obligations is contained 
In p^ges 4-31 through 433 of the record. Even a casual examination of 
this testimony by Mr. Coombs reflects not an agreement to modify, nor 
a waiver, but merely a request to have Coombs sell some contracts. 
Giving Coombs the best possible view of the evidence it discloses: 
"He (Mr. Prestwich) asked me to emphasize my 
efforts now instead on the lot sales on to the 
contract sales
 0 . 0
TT
 (R. 432, 433) 
Does this constitute a waiver or modification? Emphatically, No. 
But when specifically asked if this modified the interest provisions Mr. 
Prestwich in answer to Mr. Gordon1s question stated: 
"Q. Now, isn't it time that you and Mr. Coombs 
discussed the fact that he should divert his 
efforts toward selling these contracts rather 
than selling the lots in order to raise addit-
ional capital so the project could continue? 
A. Oh, I donTt believe I ever told him to 
stop selling lots. That was a critical issue. 
Q. ThatTs true, but thatTs not what I askedQ 
To divert his interest from selling the lots to 
concentrate his efforts on selling the contract 
rather than the lots? 
A0 I think I could have asked him, yes, to 
sell some contracts." (emphasis supplied 
R. 4-72) 
On direct examination of Mr. Prestwich in response to the following question 
TTQ. (by Mr0 Brown) Mr. Prestwich, ever had any 
discussion with Mr. Coombs as it relates to the 
selling of seven lots per month? 
A. At one point Mr. Coombs said he was having a 
hard time selling seven lots per month and didn't 
see how he could do it0 I told him I couldnTt 
see how the contract could be changed.
 0 0 I 
never authorized him to sell less than seven0 
He said why, I can't sell seven. I said you 
better sell everything you can0 The contract 
says seven lots per month or else to pay the 
interest, . ." (R0 451) 
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Smith testified emphatically that no waiver or modification 
was ever granted. At page 5M-2 of the record Smith testified: 
"By Mr. Brown. Q. Mr. Smith, during the term 
in which either in your capacity with Vista 
International or from May T72, through and in-
clusive of the time you have owned in your in-
dividual capacity, have you ever authorized any 
forgiveness of any of the conditions contained 
in Exhibit 2-P which is the joint venture agree-
ment? 
A0 I have not." 
The corporate minutes of Vista, dated February 18, 1973, long 
after any alleged modification and/or waiver supposedly took place dis-
closes that no waiver or modification was given. The Board of Directors 
of Vista declared: 
". . .no authorization had been given at any time 
by the Board of Directors to any officer to for-
give interest under this joint venture agreement 
and that the Board of Directors has had no know-
ledge of such action and that the Board of Dir-
ectors hereby makes record, for and on behalf of 
the corporation, that any interest due by Lynn 
Coombs to Vista International Corporation under 
the terms and conditions of the joint venture 
contract shall be deemed fully due and owing to 
Vista International Corporation." (Exhibit 5-P) 
The only evidence of the alleged modification as it relates to 
the forgiveness of selling seven lots spring from the mouth of Coombs. 
Coombs conveniently remembers that Mr. Prestwich: 
TT
0 . .asked me to sell the contracts." (R. M-32) 
This cannot possibly show a modification or waiver. There is 
no mutual consent nor is there any consideration, nor is there an offer 
on the part of Coombs or an acceptance on the part of Vista. No, this 
constitutes a self-serving statement that cannot overcome the clear 
11 
uncontroverted evidence on the part of Vista, Prestwich and Smith that 
the terms were never changed or varied0 Finally Coombs admitted: 
TTQo . . oMr. Coombs, I show you what has been marked 
as Exhibit 2-P and ask if you are familiar with that 
particular document? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you sign that document, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q0 Would you briefly tell the Court what that document is? 
A0 ItTs a joint venture agreement between Vista Inter-
national and myself to subdivide approximately twenty 
acres of land in West Jordan. 
. .
 0Q. And is this agreement correct is all its terms. . .? 
A. It appears to be." (R. 311, 312) 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING 
THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF 
THE JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT. 
Each party sought an accounting and a termination of the joint 
venture. The provision for the sharing of the profit is clear, concise 
and unambiguous. Exhibit 2-P states: 
"It is understood and agreed that the said Coombs 
shall not be entitled to any compensation for said 
efforts with the exception of receiving forty per-
cent of the net profits from the sale of the lots 
in said development." (emphasis supplied) 
The Trial Court interpreted the emphasized language to mean "forty 
percent of the net profits before taxes". The Trial Court added the 
words "before taxes" to the plain, clear and unambiguous words the 
parties themselves adopted0 
In Ephriam Theater Company v. Hawk, 7 Ut 2d 163, 321 P2d 221, 
223 (1958), this Court stated: 
"0 . .it is well to keep in mind the fundamental 
concepts in regard to contracts: that their pur-
pose is to reduce to writing the conditions upon 
which the minds of the parties have met and to 
fix their rights and duties in respect thereto. 
The intent so expressed is to be found, if pos-
sible, within the four corners of the instru-
ment itself in accordance with the ordinary 
accepted meaning of the words used0 0 .It would 
defeat the very purpose of formal contracts to 
permit a party to invoke the use of words or 
conduct inconsistent with its terms to prove 
that the parties did not mean what they said, 
or to use such inconsistent words or conduct 
to demonstrate uncertainty or ambiguity where 
none would otherwise exist. Generally speaking, 
neither of the parties, nor the court has any 
right to ignore or modify conditions which are 
clearly expressed merely because it may subject 
one of the parties to hardship, but they must 
be enforced in accordance with the intention 
as * * * manifested by the language used by 
the parties to the contract." 
Further this Court expressed the weight given to the Trial CourtTs 
interpretation by the following declaration: 
"Unless uncertainty opens the door to extraneous 
explanations, the trial court is in no position 
of advantage in interpreting documents, and his 
views thereon are not indulged any special credit 
as are findings on issues of fact." (Ephriam, 
supra) . 
In the case of Needles v. Kansas City, Missouri, 371 SW2d 300, 
304- (1963) , the Missouri Court stated: 
"The fact that the parties do not now agree upon 
the proper construction of their contract does 
not make it ambiguous." (citations omitted) 
The simple statement of the law found in McCallum v. Campbell-Simpson 
Motor Co,, 82 Ida 160, 3M-9 P2d 986, 990 (1960) is most appropriate in 
this instance. The Idaho Court stated: 
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"We must construe the contract according to the 
plain language used by the parties. While a 
court may interpret agreements voluntarily 
entered into, a court cannot modify an agree-
ment so as to create a new and different one, 
nor is a court at liberty to revise an agree-
ment where its interpretation is involved,, 
Courts cannot make for the parties better 
arrangements than they themselves have been 
satisfied to make, and by a process of inter-
pretation relieve one of the parties from the 
terms which he voluntarily consented to; nor 
can courts interpret an agreement to mean 
something the contract does not itself con-
tain
 0
TT
 (citations omitted and emphasis 
supplied) 
The language used by the parties is of primary importance0 The 
interest is generally deduced from the common ordinary meaning of the words 
used0 In Jensenys Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Ut 2d 273, 323 P2d 258, 260, 261 
(1958) this Court stated: 
"But it is also elementary and of extreme 
practical importance that we hold con-
tracting parties to their clear and under-
standable language deliberately committed 
to writing and endorsed by them as signa-
tories thereto. . . It is not unreasonable 
to hold one responsible for language which 
he himself espouses.
 0 . .The rule excluding 
matters outside the four corners of a clear, 
understandable document, is a fair one, and 
oneTs contentions concerning his intent should 
extend no further than his own clear expres-
sions
 0
TT 
The Washington Court in Jack v. Standard Marine Ins. Co., Wash., 
205 P2d 351 (1949) stated: 
nWe agree with counsel for appellant that, while 
definitions of words contained in standard dic-
tionaries are not controlling, they are generally 
accepted as the common meaning of the word, ... 
-14-
The common or normal meaning of language will 
be given to the words employed, unless the 
circumstances show that in a particular case, 
a special meaning should be attached to it." 
The Trial Court violated the elementary law of contract interpretation 
as stated in 17 Amjur, Contracts §242, page 629: 
"A court is not at libertyD . .to insert words 
which the parties have not made use of0 It. . . 
cannot interpret an agreement to mean something 
the contract does not itself contain. . ." 
Finally, in Paggi v. Skliris, 54 Utah 88, 179 P 739, 740 (1919) this 
Court stated: 
TT
. . .where the written agreement expresses the 
intent of the parties in plain and unambiguous 
language, it is the duty of the court to give 
effect to that language. . ." 
The term nnetTT has an acknowledged meaning. "Net", according 
to Websters New Collegiate Dictionary means: 
"Clear of, or free from, all charges, deductions, 
etc." 
"Net", according to BlackTs Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p0 1192, 
defines net as: 
"Clear of anything extraneous, with all deduct-
ions such as charges, expenses, discounts, com-
missions, taxes, etc., made." (citations omitted) 
Net profits, in BlackTs Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 1376, is 
defined as: 
"Net profits0 Theoretically all profits are 
"net", o . .But as the expression "gross pro-
fits" is sometimes used to describe the mere 
excess of present value over former cost, the 
phrase, "net profits" is appropriate to des-
cribe the gain which remains after the further 
deduction of all expenses, charges, costs, 
allowance for depreciation, etc." 
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In 17 AmJur 2d, Contracts , §24-6 and 247, p. 637, states: 
".
 0 0explicit and positive language importing 
a different purpose cannot be overruled, but 
must be given its obvious meaning.
 0 0 .Words 
used in a contract will be given their ordinary 
meaning. . ,TT 
In AmJur 2d, supra, at Contracts, 251, pQ 643, declares: 
"Although words in a contract are generally to 
be given their usual and primary meaning0 B 0 
words of art or words connected with a particu-
lar or peculiar trade are to be given the signi-
fication attached to them by experts in such 
art or trade
 e . .
TT 
APB Accounting Principles, Vol. 2, Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 2, 
page 9519, 9520: defines "net profits" as: 
"Income and profit involve net or partially net 
concepts and refer to amounts resulting from 
the deduction from revenues, or from operating 
revenues, of cost of goods sold, other expenses 
and losses, or some of them. The terms are 
often used interchangeably and are generally 
preceded by an appropriate qualifying adjective 
or term such as "gross", "operating", "net0 . 0 
before income taxes", and "net". The terms are 
also used in titles of statements showing re-
sults of operations, such as "income statement" 
or "statement of profit and loss", or, some-
times "profit and loss account." 
"The terms operating income or operating profit 
are generally used to denote "gross profit" less 
ordinary expenses. The terms net income or net 
profit refer to the results in operations after 
deducting from revenues all related costs and 
expenses and all other charges and losses 
assigned to the period0" 
Again, in Management Accounting, Text and Cases, by Robert N. Anthony, 
3rd Edition, 1964, reported 1971, at page 73, net profit is defined as: 
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"Net income (or net profit, or net loss)
 0 . . 
Profit before income taxes less provision for 
income taxes." 
There is a Utah statute which sheds light on this subject. 
Section 70A-1-205 (M-) , UCA, 1953, as amended, states: 
"The express term of an agreement and applicable 
course of dealing or usage of trade shall be 
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with 
each other; but when such construction is unreason-
able express terms control both course of dealing 
and usage of trade and course of dealing controls 
usage of trade0" 
It is apparent that the ordinary meaning, the technical mearv-
ing, and the usage in trade are all consistent with the meaning of "net 
profits" to mean after taxes and not the artifical terms inserted by 
the Trial Court of "net profits before taxes"0 The Trial Court usurped 
its position by: 1# going beyond the four corners of the contract; 2. 
going beyond the ordinary meaning of the words; 30 going beyond the 
meaning of the words attributed by experts in the field; and finally, 
M-0 going beyond the actual construction used by the parties prior to 
the litigation. 
The accounting of Elmer Fox and Company, a copy of which 
appears in the Exhibit file, discloses "net profits" after taxes. The 
Squire, Inc., the vehicle created by Coombs to effectuate the joint 
venture paid $27,4-12.00 in taxes during 1969 through 1973 (R. 28). The 
Trial Court in its minute entry adopted Elmer Fox and CompanyTs inter-
pretation on these previously paid taxes. At page 25 of the record the 
minute entry reflects: 
"The Court adopts the interpretation of Elmer 
Fox and Company, as to the issue of taxes pre-
viously paid. . .Tf 
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This is the last minute entry in time (February 14-, 1975) , and was made 
after the Court received from Elmer Fox and Company a letter dated 
January 28, 1975 wherein it stated: 
"That portion of the SquireTs tax liability result-
ing from an allocation of taxes for periods in 
which The SquireTs taxable income was offset 
against Vista1s losses would be reflected in the 
net equity of The Squire as acquired by Mr0 Smith 
or as a payable due Mr. Smith in place of Vista." 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment do not reflect 
this direct finding of the Trial Court. If the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law had followed the Trial CourtTs minute entry the 
following would be the result: 
Total Assets of The Squire, Inc. $ 24-3,824-.00 
Total Liabilities (as per Findings) 122,618.00 
Plus act payable to Smith as per the 
Trial CourtTs minute entry 27,4-12.00 
TOTAL LIABILITIES $ 150,030.00 
Net profit to be distributed 93,794.00 
Coombs share (4-0% before taxes) 37,517.60 
Less amount due to Squire from Coombs 25,726.00 
Net amount due to Coombs without 
allocation of taxes in the future $ 11,791.60 
(R0 21, 22) 
It is admitted that the contracts receivable (R. 29) of 
$166,000000 have remaining terms of approximately ten years0 The un-
fairness of the position of Coombs, apparently adopted by the Trial 
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Court, is easily demonstrated by the following example0 Assume that 
the "net profitsTT before taxes (emphasis supplied) of the Squire, Inc. 
is $100,000.00 and that the tax structure is 50%. 
$ 100,000. total net profit before taxes 
M-0,000. payable to Coombs (M-0%) 
$ 60,000. left to pay taxes and 60% to Smith 
50,000. taxes payable (50%) 
$ 10,000o balance left to Smith for his 60%o 
The clear, concise, unambiguous language used by the parties, 
must be given effect by the Court. The evidence discloses the parties 
adopted a corporate form of entity to effectuate the joint venture 
(R. M-ll)
 e The construction urged by Coombs and adopted by the Trial 
Court, is the result if the parties had used a partnership form of 
business entity. The historical payment of taxes, the use of the 
words "net profits" together with the form of business entity all 
point to the true meaning of "net profits". 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERJRED IN NOT MAKING 
COOMBS ACCOUNT FOR TRADE-IN PROPERTY 
The law is absolutely clear as to the fiduciary relationship 
of parties to a joint venture. The statutory provisions, Section 
M-8-1-18, UCA, 1953, as amended, states: 
"Every partner must account to the partnership for 
any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits, 
derived by him without the consent of the other 
partners from any transaction connected with the 
formation, conduct or liquidation of the partner-
ship or from any use by him of its property." 
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In Paggi v. Skliris, supra, at page 7M-0 of the Pacific Reporter, this 
Court stated: 
"That a member of a partnership will not be per-
mitted to take advantage of any secret agreement 
to receive a private or personal gain for the 
work or business carried on by a partnership is 
settled by the authorities." 
Coombs received by way of trade-in a home and lot from the 
Slaytons when the Slaytons purchased Lot 70. At pages 335 and 336 of 
the record Coombs testified that Exhibits 13-P and 1M-P is a true and 
accurate reflection of the Slayton transaction. Then when asked about 
the trade-in lot deeded to Coombs, Coombs stated: 
TTMr. Brown. Q. Now, Mr. Coombs, you are under oath, 
and I remind you of that because of this next question. 
Isn't it a fact, that the sale price to the Slaytons 
was not $4-200.; and isnTt it a fact, that you took in 
by way of trade-in and Mr0 and Mrs. Slayton deeded to 
you their equity in a home and lot of $1600 value? 
A. I donTt remember the value of their home and lot. 
That they deeded over to us the home and lot and it 
was another trade-in transaction. 
Q0 That is not reflected on Exhibit 13-P or 14-P, is 
it, Mr. Coombs? 
A. No. Not on those forms0 
Q. Have you ever accounted to The Squire for that lot? 
A. Yes. You have copies right there. 
Q. Talking about the lot that was traded in, Mr. Coombs? 
A. No. Wasnft necessary. 
Q. WasnTt necessary? 
A. No. 
Q. You just took $1600 worth of equity and it wasn*t 
on_ 
necessary? 
A. ThatTs right." (R. 335, 336) 
Later, the following day after a recess, the convenient memory 
of Coombs surfaced again. Under examination by Mr. Gordon, Coombs stated: 
"Qo Now, I believe you also testified yesterday, 
Mr. Coombs, regarding the sale of Lot 70 in the 
subdivision, is that correct? 
Ac Yes0 I did. 
Q. And p r io r to t ha t s a l e , did you discuss i t with 
any representat ive of The Squire? 
A. With Mr. Smith." (R. M-01) 
The same day, Mrc Smith took the witness stand and testified: 
"Mr. Brown: . .
 eMr. Smith,drawing your attention 
to the testimony of Mr. Coombs today, he testified 
that, as I recall, that he had a conversation with 
you as it relates to Lot 70 in October of 1972 via 
telephone as it relates to the trade-in home of 
some $1,600., which Mr. Slayton deeded to Coombs. 
Do you recall that in Mr. CoombsT testimony today? 
A. I recall his testimony. 
Q. Mr. Smith, did that conversation in fact take 
place? 
A0 It did not. I have never spoken to Mr. Coombs 
about trade-in on Lot 70oTT (R. 510) 
To further illustrate the convenience of Coombs1 memory and 
his willingness to testify to anything to get out of a tight place, 
Coombs1 explanation of the $1,600.00 value was: 
"A. (by Coombs) Actually the money — the $1,600.00 
and I don*t know where he gets that figure from, but 
using his figure of $1,600.00 ~ $4-00.00 of it was 
for the down payment on the lot which is represented 
on this exhibit that he showed on the closing state-
ment; $1,100.00 for lot improvement cost. 
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Q. Who improved the l o t ? 
A. I d id 0 
Q. Who pa id for those improvements? 
A. I d i d . " (R. M-02) 
First contrast this testimony to the previous day's. Coombs 
said he didnTt account at all and that he didnTt need to account. Now 
one day later, after an overnight recess, he conveniently accounts by 
a telephone conversation to Smith, which is emphatically denied by 
Smith. Next Coombs states the $M-00o00 is the down payment and $1,100. 
is the lot improvements. The down payment however is in the $4-,200. 
selling price reported to the Squire. The $l,600o trade-in lot is above 
the down payment. Immediately on cross-examination on this point, 
before any recess, Coombs states: 
TTQo (by Mr. Brown) All right. And today, sir, 
you testified that on the Slayton lot, for example, 
that you had put those improvements in and that 
the trade-in equity in the home and lot for Mr. 
Slayton was to pay for these lot improvements, 
is that correct sir? 
A. Partly, yes. 
QD The other part was the $M-00o00 down payment which 
you reported, is that correct, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, Mr. Coombs, the Slayton Lot was Lot No0 
70, wasnTt it? 
A. Yes. It was. 
Q. And in your answer to the interrogatory you had 
rented that lot to a Mr. Duane Millett and Don 
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Peterson for $59o00 per month for a total of 14-
months, is that correct? 
A0 Yes. 
Q0 . 0 0DidnTt you charge the SlaytonTs in effect 
$1,100.00 for the lot improvements? 
A. Yes0 I did0 
Q0 And in addition you received $826.00 from Mr. 
Millet and Mr. Peterson? 
A. Yes. 
o • o • o o • 
Qo o o oln fact thatTs what you have done on every 
lot that you have rented, you have either charged 
The Squire for the on-site improvements, or the 
parties who purchased it, isnTt that true? 
A0 Well, I havenTt been paid yet by The Squire0 
It*s true that I have charged them but they havenTt 
paid it." (R. 403-407) 
In the final accounting Smith gave credit for those on-site 
improvements to Coombs (see Elmer Fox and Company1s accounting). How-
ever, the Trial Court, in derrogation of the law, did not have Coombs 
account for the $1,600.00 trade-in home and lot. (R0 20). 
Coombs sold to himself Lot No. 25 for purposes of resale to 
Doyle (Exhibit 6-P). Coombs stated at page 325 of the record: 
"The sale was as an exchange of Doylefs properties 
for Lot 25 which Vista and Utah Mobile Homes did 
not want to get involved on the exchange of pro-
perties, therefore the arrangement to work it out 
was that if I would take the responsibility of the 
exchange properties, that they (The Squire, Inc.) 
would carry me on the contract of the Doyle — 
the Lot 25 balance.TT 
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Exhibit 6-P reflects however that Coombs raised the price, from 
$18,750o00 to $20,079.00, or a difference of $1,329.00. In addition 
The Squire, Inc. obtained a discount of $501.88 from Utah Mobile Homes, 
Inc. on the trailer on the lot which Coombs retained for a total amount 
of $1,830.88. Coombs testified that he reported the price of $18,750.00 
to Mr. Prestwich at pages 399 and 400 of the record. The Trial Court 
again ruled Coombs need not account for this overreaching,, 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court erred in finding that a modification as it 
relates to the cost over-runs since the modification required: 
A0 Mutual consent, and no consent was ever given by 
Vista or Smith0 
Bo No consideration was given Vista and/or Smith for 
the alleged modification0 
C. The evidence discloses that rather than consent 
Vista, Prestwich and Smith all rejected any 
modifications0 
Do Coombs admitted that Exhibit 2-P is correct in 
all its terms. 
The Trial Court erred in finding that the interest provisions 
relating to the obligation of Coombs selling seven lots had been waived 
and/or modified because: 
A. The evidence reflects only Coombs1 testimony 
about a request to sell contracts and not a 
modification or waiver0 
Bo Vista, Prestwich, and Smith rejected even any 
offer to waive and/or modify. 
C. The ^ incontroverted evidence discloses that 
the selling of seven lots was a critical 
issue and was not forgiven or waived, see 
Exhibit 5-P. 
OII„ 
The Trial Court erred in substituting its own interpretation 
in an attempt to re-write the contract. The language of the contract 
is clear and unambiguous. The intent must be obtained: 
A. From the language used by the parties0 
B. The ordinary meaning of the language used# 
C. The technical meaning of the language used0 
D. The actions of the parties showing their 
interpretations of the language so used. 
E. The Findings do not reflect the Trial CourtTs 
own ruling (see minute entry, R. 25). 
The Trial Court erred in failing to apply the law as it re-
lates to the fiduciary relationship of the parties and requiring Coombs 
to account for profits derived from the use of the joint venture pro-
perties. 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court reverse the 
lower Court and remand this action to the Trial Court with instructions 
to modify the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and 
granting judgment in favor of appellants and against respondent Coombs 
in the following particulars: 
A0 For $4-0,770.00 for cost over-runs. 
B. For $33,M-84-.l4-6 for interest expenses. 
C. Declaring the clear unambiguous language of the 
contract to mean "net profits" and not "net 
profits before taxes". 
D. An order directing Coombs to account to the 
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joint venture for funds received on the 
Slay ton Lot in the amount of $l,600o00 
and the Doyle Lot in the amount of 
$1,831.88. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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